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Feminism and the Seventeenth Century 
Many feminists of the latter half of the twentieth century identify Cartesian dualism, his 
specific form of rational thought, his individualism and his mechanical natural philosophy as 
undermining, in various ways, women, women’s ways of being in the world, or traits frequently 
codes as ‘female’ in opposition with male-coded traits.1 Yet, 400 years earlier, thinkers like 
Mary Astell, the centrepiece of this essay, took the Cartesian project – especially the dualism and 
championing of rational thought at its core – as offering immense promise to women. To borrow 
Poulain’s phrase, the immaterial mind as the seat of distinctively human rational thought ‘has no 
sex’, and so Cartesian dualism – one of the very features of Descartes’ thought that twentieth 
century feminists find most troublesome – provides an ontological basis for the radical 
egalitarianism of women’s and men’s natures as well as their modes of reasoning. Cartesianism 
forms the foundation of many of Astell’s most women-friendly philosophical innovations.2 
At the outset of the introduction to his important volume The Equality of the Sexes, 
Desmond Clarke writes of the ‘feminist egalitarianism’ at the core of the philosophies of Marie 
le Jars de Gournay, Anna Maria van Schurman, and François Poulain de la Barre.3 Indeed, the 
idea that these seventeenth century thinkers are feminist is present in the subtitle of Clarke’s 
volume: Three Feminist Texts of the Seventeenth Century. By classifying these three 
seventeenth-century thinkers and their work as feminist, Clarke invites his reader to think about 
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the nature of feminism and whether or not we can productively apply the term or the concept to 
figures writing 300 to 400 years ago. This is an especially interesting issue given the fluid – even 
contested – nature of the idea of feminism. Briefly recalling the reception of Descartes by 
feminists underscores the point that what appears as antithetical to feminists in one period may 
well by highly welcome by woman-friendly thinkers of another time period.  
But is Astell a feminist? I can imagine a strict contextualist reading of the seventeenth 
century rejecting the idea that any thinker of that century could be termed a ‘feminist.’ The word 
itself, such an argument may go, did not enter the English language until near the end of the 
nineteenth century, when the British adopted it from the French ‘féminisme’, and the French 
word originated with Charles Fourier (1772-1837) sometime in the first half of the 1800s.4 And 
the absence of the term, a strict contextualist reading might hold, indicates the absence of a way 
of thinking or a practice that actually is robustly feminist. Challenges to the idea of feminism 
existing in the seventeenth century could come from more substantive motivations as well. 
Astell, a thinker dubbed the ‘first English feminist’,5 provides a perfect example of exactly the 
sorts of substantive motivations I have in mind. One may find her endorsement of wives’ rightful 
subordination to their husbands within marriage, or her belief that her ideas apply only to the 
‘ladies’ and not to poor women and men, so antithetical to a recognizably feminist project that 
her philosophy falls too short of the mark to be thought of as feminist despite her fierce 
dedicated to the betterment of some aspects of some women’s lives.6 Similarly troubling views 
on women’s situations can be found in the writings of many thinkers who are otherwise 
generally in favor of the betterment of women’s lives. Perhaps as a result of these considerations, 
some commentators, at least, have maintained that to speak of feminism 300 to 400 years ago is 
to commit a ‘vile anachronism.’7 
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However, another contextualist approach that is more promising starts with Nietzsche’s 
famous (and parenthetical!) comment in The Genealogy of Morals that ‘[o]nly something which 
has no history is capable of being defined.’8 While much ink has been spilt over this evocative 
thought, one way of thinking about this claim is to note that a concept with a history will mean 
very different things throughout the lifetime of that concept precisely because of the different 
meanings brought to it by different historical contexts. This can be said of the idea – whether the 
word exists or not – of feminism. Recognizing this – that feminism, as a concept with a history, 
evades definition – is helpful in thinking about the early modern period and the women and men 
who wrote favourably about women in these centuries. For one regularly comes across early 
modern thinkers whose ideas about women, their minds, their liberties, their very selves, strike 
the modern mind as distinctively feminist, and yet who also embrace ideas that we find 
troublesome, precisely on feminist grounds. But drawing upon Nietzsche’s idea expressed above, 
we might say that ‘feminism’ cannot be defined precisely because it is embedded in different 
historical contexts, and that we can recognize ideas from the past as being feminist ideas for that 
time period, or feminist ideas given what they subsequently made possible in the evolution of 
feminism. Our forebears who generated these forward-looking ideas are the giants upon whose 
shoulders contemporary feminists are currently standing. Given the expansiveness of this second 
contextualist approach, I think Clarke is right to think of these historical figures as feminist, and 
this paper is meant to defend that claim in the case of Astell. 
This is a paper about Astell’s feminism in two of its forms, and the relationship between 
her feminism and her philosophy of education. The first form of feminism is that mentioned at 
the outset of this paper, and it draws positively upon Cartesian philosophy. This is Astell’s 
commitment to women’s and men’s equality in their rational essence. This feminism can be seen 
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an early example of a form of contemporary feminism now called ‘equality feminism’ within the 
broader category of ‘classical-liberal feminism’, albeit with a significant qualification, which I’ll 
mention shortly. Equality feminists take certain character traits that have been traditionally coded 
as those definitive of men to be precisely just that: coded. These traits are not essential to men 
and men alone, and women can exhibit these traits too. In fact, not only can women exhibit these 
trait; women ought to cultivate these traits for they will give women the sort of advantages in the 
world that have tended to be the province of men.9 The important qualification in the case of 
Astell is that, while she embraces equality when it comes to all humans’ essential rational 
natures, she is not in the liberal tradition, for neither women nor men have rights. Their rational 
natures entail equal duties that they all have toward God. But Astell does believe that women 
ought to cultivate the sort of rational nature typically associated with men for the theological 
advantages that will accrue to them as a result. 
The second form of feminism I locate in Astell also has its roots in the early modern 
period, it also receives more fully-developed theoretical treatment in contemporary feminism, 
and with this form of feminism, Astell moves decisively away from certain features of 
Descartes’ philosophy. This is a feminism grounded in the recognition of the value – sometimes 
even the superiority – of traits typically associated with women, traits which are usually 
denigrated simply because of their association with women. Contemporary moral theories that 
focus on care are examples of this approach.10 A variety of this form of feminism appears in the 
early modern period, and it is also discussed briefly by Clarke in his introduction to The Equality 
of the Sexes. This form of feminism is manifest in one party to the querelle des femmes, namely 
those who argue for the superiority of the female sex.11 One can think of male-coded and female-
coded traits as being either essential to the sexes or socially-constructed and thus accidental. 
 5 
There are suggestions of both possibilities in Astell. For she surely believes (as noted above) in 
the essential sameness across genders of the non-sexed immaterial soul.12 As such, gender 
differences would seem to be for her socially-constructed, and this would apply to female-coded 
traits no less than to male-coded traits. On this model, men no less than women would benefit 
from adopting helpful female-coded traits, just as Astell urges women to develop their rational 
natures (erstwhile conceived of as a male trait). And indeed, there are places where Astell 
suggests that husbands should exhibit some of these traits typically associated with women for 
the betterment of marriage.13 At the same time, Astell knows that unsexed souls are nonetheless 
embodied in sexed bodies while we live on earth, and she believes that these bodies have an 
influence on the soul. She does sometimes seem to suggest that such embodiment can result in 
intrinsic, even if not essential, differences between men and women during their embodiment. 14 
These are not socially-constructed differences, even while they are not the most fundamentally 
essential features of people either. Whatever the source of the differences between men and 
women, traits typically coded as female – e.g. community, loving friendship, other-regardingness 
along side self-regard – are lauded by feminists of this second variety, and we see this in Astell, 
too. Importantly, we must also acknowledge that some female-coded traits result in Astell’s 
believing that women have specific gendered duties (caring for children, for example),15 a belief 
that many contemporary thinkers would find troublesome from a feminist perspective. Without 
downplaying this troublesome aspect of her philosophy, it is also true that she finds traits 
typically associated with women to be highly valuable, and this is the feature of her thought I 
shall emphasize in this paper. The way in which this form of feminism moves away from 
Descartes is in its emphasis on community, which stands in contrast with the stark individual 
isolationism of Descartes’ own life, which significantly informs aspects of his normative 
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philosophy.16 Both forms of feminism – equality feminism and feminism grounded in valuing, 
rather than denigrating, female ways of being in the world – work together in her philosophy of 
education to help women who have strayed from the true theological and moral path due to 
perverse social customs find their way back to their true, essentially rational natures, which they 
equally share with men. 
 
II. Equality Feminism: Reason and a Woman’s Mind 
In her masterful book on Astell, Jacqueline Broad identifies in Astell’s writings ‘two types of 
woman or female characters – the one weak and dissatisfied, the other strong and at peace with 
the world.’17 The latter character type is as she is in effect because she has cultivated her true, 
essential nature in order to realize her true theologically-defined purpose of serving God.18 Broad 
captures a number of important traits that characterize this sort of woman, including: 
Her happiness does not depend on... other people, material goods, and the variable 
opinions of men.... She is unmoved by both good and bad fortune.... She knows 
her happiness does not depend upon anything outside her own mind.... Above all, 
this woman lives her life in accordance with reason.... She does not see someone 
else’s success as a cause for envy; she has too strong a sense of self-esteem to 
want to pull others down.... In her close friendships, she is loving, loyal and 
unselfish: she desires her friends’ well-being for their own sakes and not for her 
own pleasure or profit.... [H]er passions are always reserved for things that merit 
them: she loves those who steadfastly pursue virtue, she has a desire to see good 
prevail, and she feels joy when a friend triumphs. In short, this woman lives up to 
the dignity of her nature as a free and rational being.19 
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This virtuous female type will serve as the focus of this section, in which I detail how Astell’s 
vision of the virtuous female captures her commitment to the essential natural equality of women 
and men. As is underscored by many points in the above characterization, Astell’s equality 
feminism is squarely rooted in Cartesian philosophy, broadly conceived.20 
Astell’s equality feminism21 starts from a commitment to a Cartesian ontology of the 
human, specifically his dualism of soul and body22 according to which the thinking soul23 is the 
mark of the divine within each of us and is our human essence.24 While the soul may be 
embodied during our time on earth, it will eventually be free from the body after the latter’s 
death.25 Since sex attaches to bodies and not to souls, women’s human essence is identical with – 
and thus equal to – that of men. This is the bedrock of Astell’s feminism, and it informs her 
prescription for how women ought to treat themselves. For example: ‘I suppose then that you’re 
fill’d with a laudable Ambition to brighten and enlarge your Souls, that the Beauty of your 
Bodies is but a secondary care….’26 
Astell’s Cartesian ontology encourages her to adopt a broadly Cartesian epistemology.27 
All humans have different ‘Modes of Understanding’ – faith, science and opinion, but 
‘[k]knowledge in a proper and restricted sense’ belongs to the scientific mode of understanding 
because it starts from premises clearly and distinctly known and reaches conclusions through 
deduction.28 The scientific mode of understanding is starkly contrasted with the senses through 
which we may be conscious but through which we do not know.29 Part of our tasks as knowers is 
to understand our various cognitive capacities, recognize our limits, and constrain ourselves 
therein,30 another obviously Cartesian point. 
From this taxonomy of cognitive abilities and their relation to knowledge an essentially 
Cartesian method for gaining knowledge follows, with the Cartesian-inspired Port Royal logic of 
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Arnauld and Nicole31 also playing a key role in Astell’s method. She sums up her account with 
six rules, with the sixth being crucial for my purposes: ‘To judge no further than we Perceive, 
and not to take anything for Truth, which we do not evidently Know to be so.’32 This rule 
commands us to accept as truth that which we believe through science or faith, but to reject as 
truth that which we believe through opinion. Astell also alerts us to various sources of error that 
normally derail us from the path to true knowledge, and crucial sources of error are the senses 
and related aspects of our embodied nature such as the passions.33 She thus encourages us to 
‘withdraw ourselves as much as may be from Corporeal things, that pure Reason may be heard 
the better….’34 Two feminist advantages emerge from Astell’s epistemology and method. First, 
echoing a point central to Descartes, the certainly of science – that is, of starting from clear and 
distinct perceptions and reasoning step-wise through deduction to conclusions – is contrasted 
with the uncertainty of mere opinions, and the former mode of understanding is highly 
individualistic. This allows the individual to challenge traditional beliefs held by members of a 
society at large; that is, this allows a woman to challenge customary beliefs that undermine 
women, such that their beauty matters more than their intellects. Second, Astell strongly links 
rationality with human essence while also disengaging the passions from our human essence, and 
this applies equally to men and women alike. She thus rejects the traditional pairing of women 
with irrational passions and men with rationality, a rejection that has obvious benefit for women. 
The way in which we develop our God-given rationality is to pursue a good education as 
opposed to a bad education.35 Bad customs are those that pervert our natural selves, and bad 
education is one that does not develop our God-given rationality, thus robbing us of the means 
by which we attain our end of honoring and serving God. ‘This Ignorance and a narrow 
Education lay the Foundation of Vice, and Imitation and Custom rear it up.’36 Conversely, good 
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customs are those that cultivate our natural, God-given selves, and good education is one that 
develops and perfects our God-given rationality, thus enabling us to attain our end of honoring 
and serving God, including by helping others perfect their rationality.37 Indeed, this last point is 
the point of her Serious Proposal in which she lays out the details and foundations of a good 
education precisely, I suggest, to bring about better customs for generations after Astell’s own. 
Astell, like Descartes, thus connects two crucial elements in her philosophy. First, the 
ontology of the human, and the related epistemology and method which follow from this, allow 
one to rely upon her own God-given nature – especially her rational capacities – in order to reach 
whatever truths about the world she is able to reach. Second, developing one’s rational capacities 
allows one to reject customs which her own rational nature tells her are wrong. These crucial 
elements contribute to what I have been calling Astell’s equality feminism. Any woman who 
acknowledges the ontology of all humans, the subsequent ways of gaining truth, and the proper 
education one must follow to gain truth and cultivate her rational soul will realize her best nature 
as captured at the outset of this section in Broad’s characterization of the virtuous woman. The 
goal of the second part of A Serious Proposal to the Ladies is to offer a method by which women 
can cultivate and improve their minds so as to realize as fully as possible their rational natures. In 
principle, it is a method that could be practiced anywhere, by any individual capable to reading 
the book. 
In practice, however, especially in the practical lives of seventeenth-century women, 
more is required. For unfortunately, most women find themselves receiving bad education, if any 
at all, and the negative role of bad customs in the formation of women’s characters results in 
their becoming non-virtuous women. These women, more than any, will benefit from a specific 
features of the education institution which are not captured by Astell’s method of rightly 
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developing one’s reason. These features have to do with the exclusionary nature of the 
institutions in which Astell thinks women should receive their educations, and the relationships 
that can develop within these women-only educational institutions. These features also 
underscore the value of community and loving friendships, values more typically coded as 
female. 
 
III. Feminism and Women’s Communities 
The description that Broad gives of Astell’s ‘weak and dissatisfied’ – that is, non-virtuous – 
woman is striking to one familiar with the history of early modern philosophies of education. 
Here is part of Broad’s description: 
Her happiness depends upon other people, material things, and circumstances 
beyond her control. She is especially concerned with the opinions of men: she 
likes to hear herself complimented, she enjoys one man’s attention, and she 
welcomes the gaze of others. Because her pleasures arise from ‘the constant 
flattery of external Objects’, she is ‘perpetually uneasy’, and she is anxious about 
‘the great uncertainty and swift vicissitudes of worldly things.’38 
What is striking about this characterization is that this woman is governed by amour propre in 
the negative way that Jean Jacques Rousseu would characterize that passion a century later in his 
educational treatise, Émile.39 The concept of amour propre – and the closely related passion, 
amour de soi – has an extended history in the early modern period, and Astell was certainly 
aware of the concept. The idea is found in the writings of Blaise Pascal, François de la 
Rochefoucauld, Pierre Nicole (likely Astell’s source for the idea) and others. Astell writes about 
the two forms of self-love, the productive amour de soi (in Rousseau’s eventual terminology) 
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and the destructive amour propre (as termed by Nicole, Rousseau and others) in the second part 
of The Serious Proposal. 
Again Self-love, an excellent Principle when true, but the worst and most 
mischievous when mistaken, disposes us to be retentive of our Prejudices and 
Errors, especially when it is joyn’d as most commonly it is with Pride and 
Conceitedness.40 
Earlier, in the first part of the Proposal, Astell associates mistaken self-love with the weak 
character type identified by Broad. Astell writes: 
... she who has nothing else to value herself upon, will be proud of her Beauty, or 
Money, and what that can purchase; and think herself mightily oblig’d to him, 
who tells her she has those Perfections which she naturally longs for. Her inbred 
self-esteem and desire of good, which are degenerated into Pride and mistaken 
Self-love will easily open her Ears to whatever goes about to nourish and delight 
them.41 
Finally, in a letter to John Norris, she makes explicit her belief that mistaken self-love (again, 
what is termed amour propre by her French counterparts in the early modern period) comes 
about when we regard ourselves in so far as we are in some sort of relation with others, rather 
than due to something intrinsically valuable within ourselves. 
I cannot forbear to reckon it an Affection, and an Effect of vicious Self-love, to 
love any Person merely on the account of his Relation to us. All other motive 
being equal, this may be allowed to weigh down the Scale; but certainly no Man 
is the better in himself for being akin to me, and nothing but an overweaning 
Opinion of my self can induce me to think so.42 
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In these passages, Astell focuses primarily on mistaken self-love, but she does recognize 
a valuable self-love, namely that which we hold for ourselves when we value our minds and 
virtue, and seek to improve these features of ourselves. It is a self-love that is not dependent 
upon what others think of us, and nor does it encourage us to cultivate bodily and other material 
advantages in order to gain the admiration of others.43 Self-love is closely associated with self-
esteem – self-esteem is the broader category, and when it goes wrong, it does so because of the 
dual character perversions of pride and mistaken self-love. 
Reading Astell’s treatment of good self-love and perverted self-love, alongside 
Rousseau’s treatment of amour de soi and amour propre is especially valuable for two reasons at 
least. First, reading these two educational theories and the role of amour propre therein side by 
side presents a stunning example of what philosophers of the past few decades have called the 
difference between ideal and non-ideal theory. Second, both thinkers deal with these concepts in 
the context of their educational treatises, and the divergence in those treatise on how to deal with 
the negative amour propre underscores Astell’s focus on female-coded traits of community and 
friendship rather than the male-coded trait of isolated individualism that is at the core of the first 
books of Émile. I detail some very basic elements of Rousseau’s account of amour propre and 
some essential features of Astell’s community of women in educational institutions first before 
turning to what Rousseau’s theory, in contrast with Astell’s, can tell us about Astell’s feminism. 
Rousseau’s Émile can be profitably read as a proposed solution to an ill that he diagnoses 
in the opening pages of The Social Contract: ‘Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains’44. 
While the human is born to eventually take on his natural state of being free, equal, 
unprejudiced, self-sufficient and whole, living in the artifice of society results in the human 
becoming enchained by laws he plays no role in making, in relationships of inequality, full of 
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false opinions and superstitions, dependent, and split between his inclinations and desires on the 
one hand and his duties on the other hand. Émile, Rousseau’s educational philosophy, is a 
treatise about the power of education to save man – one man as an example, namely Émile – 
from this latter state and to deliver him into adulthood in his rightfully natural state; it is a 
treatise on the education of the natural man. 
One central, and for my purposes especially interesting, feature of Émile’s early 
education is the prevention of the rise of amour propre. Amour propre is a passion, and for 
Rousseau, the passions emerge in humans at an early age, unlike reason, which begins to emerge 
at only at adolescence45. Amour propre is a kind of self-love, perhaps even self-esteem, that 
comes about as a result of regarding oneself through another’s eyes. It is self-love placed in the 
context of another human: to have amour propre means one can love or esteem oneself only if 
others do too. This leads to living outside oneself and through the opinions and desires of others: 
one does what he believes others want him to do, he is what others want him to be, and he gains 
his sense of value through others’ evaluations of him. As a result, amour propre results in one 
treating oneself as a means and not an end: he uses himself as a means to gain the approval of 
others. But he also treats others as means and not as ends so as to manipulate them to improve 
his position and not their own. Since amour propre depends upon comparing oneself with others 
in a competitive way, others must be prevented from making themselves better if at all possible. 
So amour propre results in everyone treating everyone else as a means to one’s own end of 
attaining superiority over others. Amour propre is contrasted with amour de soi, a self-love and 
self-esteem that is good and healthy. Amour de soi is entirely self-focused and makes no 
reference to something or someone outside of the self. It is a selfish love in the sense of being 
without reference to another person: humans are born with this kind of self-love and it is natural 
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to us and hence good46. The education of Émile is meant to suppress amour propre and to 
cultivate amour de soi until Émile reaches the age of puberty when amour propre can be 
profitably harnessed – and therefore has value – to introduce Émile to civil society, which he 
must enter for his adulthood47. 
Rousseau’s suggested method for guiding Émile safely through childhood and the 
avoidance of amour propre produces a completely impossible and impractical educational 
theory. Émile is to be raised in the country, away from the corrupting influences of city life, 
under the care of a nameless tutor who manipulates Émile’s natural environment so as to help 
Émile learn his lessons by negotiating the necessities of the natural world – and never by 
negotiating the will of another. If Émile can learn without seeing himself vis-à-vis others but 
rather vis-à-vis natural necessity, then Émile can learn without the opportunity for amour propre 
to take hold in his early years48. If he can learn by overcoming natural obstacles, then he can 
value himself for feats he has accomplished by himself, and this amour de soi can take root. 
However impossible and impractical this educational ideal is, Rousseau’s piercing insight into 
the damaging influences on young lives of amour propre and the empowering influence on 
young lives of amour de soi is an accomplishment in itself.49 But his educational ideal remains 
impossible and impractical. 
Like Rousseau a century after her, Astell also diagnoses an ill: women raised so as to 
exhibit precisely the kind of self-love – amour propre – that both Astell and Rousseau find so 
troublesome for healthy and full human development. Like Rousseau, Astell’s proposed solution 
is a specific form of education. For women50 – Astell’s singular focus – good education should 
occur in a religious retreat, a women’s-only educational institution. This is because bad customs 
are so wide spread in the world dominated by men ‘who under pretence of loving and admiring 
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[women], really serve their own base ends,’51 that women’s true nature simply cannot be 
developed in that wider world – they will be too easily kept in a state of amour propre. A 
number of points about this religious retreat should be emphasized. First, it is a religious retreat, 
in keeping with Astell’s overall theological purposes. The religious retirement will draw 
women’s attention away from the this-worldly, bodily concerns that currently dominate their 
attention, cultivating mistaken self-love and it will turn women’s attention toward the cultivation 
of her soul ‘so that here’s a vast treasure gain’d, which for ought I know, may purchase an happy 
Eternity.’52 Second, it is especially important for women to be afforded such a retreat because of 
the disproportionate burden women bear living in the world of bad customs.53 Third, women-
only retreats cultivate the value of true female friendship – ‘a Vertue which comprehends all the 
rest.’54 Female friendship is valuable not only for its own sake but because it helps women to 
develop the ability to withstand bad customs that tempt them away from their God-given ends of 
self-perfection and perfection of others’ souls, customs to which they will once again be exposed 
should they be forced to leave the retreat.55 And women will have to leave the retreat. ‘It is not 
my intention that you shou’d seclude your selves from the World, I know it is necessary that a 
great number of you shou’d live in it; but it is Unreasonable and Barbarous to drive you into’t, 
e’re you are capable of doing Good in it, or at least of keeping Evil from your selves.’56 
Pivotal to the success of her religious retreat is the power of female friendship. According 
to Astell, human creatures deserve the love of benevolence from one another; this is to be 
contrasted with the love of desire we owe to God.57 Benevolence is the source of our friendship 
with others, and in the female-only religious retreat, it is a benevolence women feel toward one 
another. Such a friendship 
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has a special force to dilate [open] our hearts, to deliver them from that vicious 
selfishness, and the rest of those sordid Passions which express a narrow illiberal 
temper, and are of such a pernicious consequence to Mankind…. But by 
Friendship I do not mean any of those intimacies that are abroad in the world, 
which are often combinations in evil and at best but insignificant dearnesses…. 
But I intend by it the greatest usefulness, the most refin’d and disinteress’d 
Benevolence, a love that thinks nothing within the bounds of Power and Duty, too 
much to so or suffer for its Beloved; And makes no distinction betwixt its Friend 
and its self….58 
A true friendship cannot be developed hastily, for it requires that ‘we look into the very Soul of 
the beloved Person, to discover what resemblance it bears to our own.’ Astell underscores the 
purpose of such a friendship: ‘The truest effect of love being to endeavour the bettering of the 
beloved Person,’59 which for Astell must mean the cultivation of the friend’s rational capacities 
so she can honor and serve God. Astell’s account of female friendship rests upon an individual 
recognizing the subjectivity of others. This is supported by her belief that true friendship requires 
that we come to know the soul of another and to acknowledge the likeness of that soul to one’s 
own; both are subjects. Indeed, true friendship ‘makes no distinction’ between the other and the 
self, showing that the true friend acknowledges the other’s subjectivity just as we acknowledge 
our own. Education in such an institution will provide the strongest bulwark against women’s 
fall into mistaken self-love – amour propre – and it will help them cultivate their minds and 
virtues so that they may strengthen their true self-love – amour de soi. 
The contrasts between Rousseau’s and Astell’s educational philosophies is notable for 
two reasons. First, in recent years, much ink in philosophy has been spilt in the debate 
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surrounding ideal versus non-ideal theory. This debate has appeared in a different fields of 
philosophy, from political philosophy more generally, to feminist philosophy and philosophy of 
race, to philosophy of education. Applied to political theories of justice, for example, ‘[i]deal 
theory attempts to construct a model of what an ideally just society would look like, or what 
principles ideally just procedures would follow. It then identifies injustices in our actual world 
by measuring how our world falls short of the ideal.’60 Applied to educational philosophy, ideal 
theory constructs a model of what an ideal educational system would look like. This is to be 
contrasted with non-ideal theory, which ‘starts from a non-ideal state and seeks solutions to the 
problems identified in that state. Political philosophy[’s]... task is to articulate the problems we 
face, then diagnose their causes, and finally to formulate solutions.’61 Applied to educational 
philosophy, non-ideal theory identifies problem with actual educational practices, diagnoses their 
causes and formulates solutions which are practicable within educational institutions. Given the 
degree of its implausibility, it is hard to imagine that Rousseau’s educational philosophy is an 
example of an ideal theory, which we might assume could attain even if in the distant future; no 
educational system could ever replicate Émile’s education for more than a small handful of 
children (were it even desirable for any child). But it is certainly meant to deliver ideal results 
with respect to Émile’s self-esteem. At the very least, we can safely say that Rousseau’s theory is 
far indeed from non-ideal theory. For rather than starting with the live problem of individuals 
suffering from amour propre and looking for philosophical ways to address this problem, 
Rousseau’s theory is meant to keep that problem from ever arising in the first place. 
By contrast, Astell’s philosophy of education is a classical example of non-ideal theory: 
identify an ill (women’s tendency to be dominated by mistaken self-love), identify the causes 
(living in the male-dominated world filled with customs that pervert women’s true natures), and 
 18 
formulate a solution (encourage women to retreat to a single-sexed educational institution in 
which women benefit from loving friendships with other women in their dismantling of mistaken 
self-love and replacement of it with true self-love). Astell’s is a theory that addresses the lived 
experiences of real women in a way that is immediately practicable. One might imagine that 
Astell is led to her non-ideal theory of education precisely because of the urgency that women 
like Astell feel to rid themselves of their own highly non-ideal circumstances. 
From a feminist perspective, a second general conclusion emerges from the contrast 
between Rousseau’s and Astell’s approaches to education and the problem of amour propre. 
Rousseau’s solution is to go the route of rugged individualism taken to an extreme. Émile will be 
raised with as little meaningful human contact as possible. He will be kept from the world of 
men for as long as possible. He will be raised in accordance with the male-coded traits of self-
reliance, independence, and extreme individualism. At the conclusion of his childhood and early 
youth – just before he is to be introduced to society – Émile ‘considers himself without regard to 
others and finds it good that others do not think of him. He demands nothing of anyone and 
believes he owes nothing to anyone. He is alone in human society; he counts on himself alone.... 
Amour propre, the first and most natural of all the passions, is still hardly aroused in him’62. This 
isolated individualism captures much of the spirit of Descartes’ normative theory, focused as it is 
on that which is fully within control of the individual. 
Astell’s women, by contrast both with Rousseau’s Émile and with Descartes’ prescription 
to rely as much on one’s own self as possible, will retreat to a community of benevolent women 
who will love each other as generous souls ought to love one’s fellow. They will care for each 
other’s souls as if they were their own. They will hone their own virtue and help others in this 
quest as well. Astell’s women will retreat to a world ruled in accordance with the female-coded 
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traits of community and interdependence, care, and concern for others. And these traits are 
highly valuable, according to Astell, because they will be the solution to the ill that has befallen 
women. This lauding of typically female-coded traits for the great good those traits can bring to 
people’s lives is Astell’s second form of feminism, alongside her first form based in human 
egalitarianism, and for all her flaws on other feminist issues, her strength on these two warrant 
our thinking of her as a feminist for her time. 
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